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JUDGES, as a rule, must approach political problems interstitially,
for they do not choose the subjects upon which they are to pro-
nounce. It is rare, therefore, for a judge to exhibit a philosophy
of politics which implies more than a series of half-conscious
assumptions from which the ingenious student may hope to ex-
tract inferences of a general kind. The judge, moreover, is
rarely, either by nature or training, a systematic philosopher.
His life has been passed in minute attention to the particular;
his practical value to the community depends at least as much
upon his deliberate avoidance of the universal as upon his search
for its attainment. We can hazard a view about the way in
which Chief Justice Marshall or Lord Eldon, Sir Edward Coke
or Mansfield would have approached the political scheme of
things entire; for the circumstances of their period bound them
to diverse exposition in varied fields of effort. But, for the
most part, the political philosophy of judges is a series of half-
articulate hints which men like Mlontesquieu or Bentham or
Savigny must mold into a system.
To this general rule, Mr. Justice Holmes is no exception. We
know, in fairly rigorous outline, the manner of his approach to
political problems; but fate has made the connectionbetween
philosophic background and detailed principle inevitably frag-
mentary in character. The things we might wish to know, his
views, for instance, upon the merits and weaknesses of demo-
cratic government, his theory of the ultimate nature of the
state, his attitude as to the proper limits, if any, of collectivist
action, these are not issues susceptible of exhaustive analysis
from the Bench. He has had to work within the framework of
*Professor of Political Science, London School of Economics and Political
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a constitution which shaped the permissive boundaries of his
possible speculations, and upon the legitimacy of statutes of
which the social desirability was, for the most part, beyond his
competence as a judge. And the attempt to construct a general
framework is, in his case, the more difficult because his work
has been singularly free from the habit, not uncommon among
his colleagues of the last half century, of erecting private preju-
dice into legal principle. His decisions probably contain fewer
obiter dicta which seek a definite measure of the expediency of
legislation than those of any judge of the Supreme Court in
modern times. With a self-abnegation which is remarkable, he
has used the principles of the American Constitution as a method
of analysis and not a scale of judgment, a pathway to, not a bar-
rier against, an end which must remain permanently undefined.
Nor is this all. It is an essential characteristic of Mr. Justice
Holmes' judicial work that it is inherently sceptical and relativist
in temper. In a sense, perhaps, the category of time has been
for him the penumbra which gives validity to all exercise ofjudgment. Nothing in his decisions exhibits the confident
dogmatism of Field or Brewer or Peckham. He has been much
more concerned with the ways of attaining ends thah with the
ends themselves. Himself a consistent experimentalist in out-
look, he has not conceived that the Constitution debars men from
attempting experiments which he himself has obviously thought
dubious or unwise. He has always had a profound sense of the
possible varieties of social opinion, the uncertainty, accordingly,
whether any or all of them are finally adequate; and this has
meant, for him, a view of the judicial function which limits its
competence to checking obvious infractions of fundamental rules,
instead of so extending it as to make the judiciary the ultimate
arbiter of the national destiny.
Yet, back of it all, there has lain a fairly consistent vision.
The analyst cannot pin him down to a detailed code of beliefs;
but he can at least exhibit the temper in which he has approached
their making. He can see, above all, the influence upon him of
that historical school of thought in which he has himself been
so eminent a figure; with the interesting difference that whereas,
with all save Maitland, historical learning has tended to make
most lawyers conservative and averse from deliberate experi-
ment, with Mr. Justice Holmes awareness of the inevitability
of change has made him accept the innovation of others, even
where he has doubted its wisdom, as part of the necessary social
process. It has made him, in a word, the spectator of law in a
sense that has enabled him to see, as few judges have seen, what
Montesquieu really meant by his definition of its substance.
There has thus entered into him something of that power to see
things sub specie aeternitatis which mainly assures the power to
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make a permanent contribution to the development of political
thought.
II
The keynote of Mr. Justice Holmes' political outlook is a rejec-
tion of absolutist concepts. All principles are true in merely a
relative way. The individual is not a subject of rights which
the state is not entitled to invade. Men are social animals; and
what they are entitled to do is a matter of degree, born of expe-
rience in some particular time and place. Man may be an end
to himself; to society, he is but a means likely enough to be used
for purposes he may passionately deny. We are not entitled to
formulae of any kind for the simple reason that the things we
cannot help believing to be true are not necessarily the inescap-
able laws of the universe. Our code of behavior, for him, is
simply "a body of imperfect social generalizations expressed in
terms of emotion," adequate only as they are capable of quanti-
tative tactical confirmation.' -There is never in any society a
single body of agreed desires, but always conflicting purposes
usually attainable only by inconsistent means. At the bottom of
social life there lies always this inescapable battle of human
wills; and the decision is reached by the power which one set of
men uses to vindicate its superiority over another set. There
is, in short, in Mr. Justice Holmes a Spinoza proclaiming that
might gives to right its letters of credit; and that realism re-
fuses the admission of ultimates as attainable in political phi-
losophy.
So he rejects the idea of natural law.2 It is no more than
man's restless craving for the superlative, and, at bottom, it
means no more than the system which has become so fully a
part of our intellectual climate that we cannot work our institu-
tions successfully except upon its assumptions. And with the
idea of natural law there goes also the idea of rights which, a
little scornfully perhaps, he has defined as the "hypostasis of a
prophecy." Rights, for him, are claims of which the validity is
proved by their capacity to realize themselves. They state our
desires; they leave behind them no more than what he has called
"the fighting will of the subject to maintain them."'  He re-
jects, accordingly, any attempt at a priorism. Rights are not the
postulates of a pre-existing framework within which law must
work. They are the product of law, maintained as the posses-
sion of citizens because that part of the community which has
the power to maintain them is prepared to fight to that end.
Law, therefore, becomes the expression of the will of the strong-
'HOLmEs, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1921) 306.
2 Ibid 310 ff.
Ibid. 313.
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er part of society; and the state is the organization of the insti-
tutions which give form and coherence to the expression so
maintained.
It is, in part, the creed of a soldier, and, in part, also, the
realism of one who feels intensely the limits of human knowl-
edge. What he has called the cosmic plan of campaign remains
for him unrevealed. All we can do in matters of social con-
stitution is to seek the realization of our desires. If we are
wise, we shall scrutinise the facts about us and seek so to adjust
our will as to make it accord with the possible; "personally," he
has written, "I like to know what the bill is going to be before
I order a luxury."4 To feel it possible that one may be wrong;
to doubt the wisdom of all panaceas; to subject the claim of the
individual to the inevitable criterion of social welfare; to recog-
nize how inescapably one's ideals'are bound up with a finite
system of experience, how little, therefore, they are entitled to
pose as universal; to interpret the historic process as the out-
come, not of a victory for necessary truth, but as the record of
what men were prepared to die for rather than surrender; these
are the contours of Mr. Justice Holmes' political faith. It is, in
a sense, a Stoic's philosophy, a refusal to accept optimistic illu-
sion as against the sense of the facts that die Weltgesedchhte
has indeed been das Weltgericht. There is, too, a certain note
of sadness in it, as in all Stoic philosophy. But, with him, as
with Spinoza once more, the sadness is modified by its permea-
tion with the sense that what men claim carries with it a con-
tingent validity by the fact that it is already a claim. For those
who become, by their demands, the plaintiffs against tradition
may start as a minority. They yet work in the prospect that
the force of the future may be on their side.
That attitude is the root of what has not seldom been inter-
preted as Mr. Justice Holmes' radicalism. In truth, the inter-
pretation is a wholly mistaken one. A famous speech makes
it evident that the basis of his economic faith would have been
rejected neither by Adam Smith nor Ricardo; that, where prop-
erty is concerned, he is satisfied to consider wise administration
as the justification of ownership.5 What has been called his
radicalism is, in fact, no more than the inevitable result of his
sceptical outlook. To regard tradition as invariably upon the
defense is necessarily to allow the other man the maximum op.
portunity to discard its teaching. Within, therefore, the limits
that the preservation of order permits, he has not been willing
to deny effort of which he disapproved.
This explains his liberalism in relation to tenets which his
more conservative colleagues have rejected. It explains, for ex-
4 Ibid. 307.
5 Ibid. 279 ff.
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ample, the famous dissent in the Abrams case; 6 that is not, as
has often been supposed, the consecration of freedom of speech,
but the announcement that in his judgment for Mr. Abrams to
differ from the government of the United States was not a
direct incitement to immediate disorder. It explains, again, a
view he has often taken, as in Lochner v. New York, 7 of the
limits to social experiment. If, he says in effect, a body of my
fellow-countrymen choose to take the view that certain legisla-
tion is wise, their failure to conform to previous canons of wis-
dom does not inherently upset their right to their opinion. The
test of legitimate purpose in state-action is not the wisdom of
our ancestors, but whether reasonable men could, upon the facts
before them, have drawn the inferences which a particular legis-
lature has chosen to draw. Here, once more, the very founda-
tion of his outlook is the vivid sense of the relativity of tradition.
It is almost inherent in this philosophy that Mr. Justice Holmes
should have been the forerunner of the sociological interpreta-
tion of law. He sees law, no doubt, as the sovereign's fiat, valid,
in essence, because the authority of the state will go to its en-
forcement. He states it, also, in terms of an irresponsible and
unlimited will such as Hobbes himself would have strongly ap-
proved.8 But he sees always behind the act of sovereignty that
mysterious congeries of impalpable forces which made John
Chapman Gray say in despair that the real rulers of a society
are undiscoverable.9 It is this, also, which makes him separate
with some sharpness law and morals. ' Law is simply the body
of rules of behavior which a particular society at a particular
time is prepared to enforce. To say that they are right means
for him only that the particular society is at that particular
time prepared to enforce them. The content of its will is always
born of a special experience which circumstances may change.
And this, again, has made him wary of exaggerating the place
of logic in social arrangements. Many years before Professor
Graham Wallas had written his epoch-making Hurman Nature in
Politics, Mr. Justice Holmes, in a classic paper,"1 had written
with brilliant insight into what he called "the fallacy of logical
form." He had seen for how much tradition and imitation
count in our acceptance of rules of which the substance has long
since been obsolete. -He had refused to agree that "a given
system . . . can be worked out like mathematics from some gen-
6 Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 40 Sup. Ct. 17 (1919).
7 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539 (1905).
s Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349, 27 Sup. Ct. 526 (1907).
9 GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (2d ed. 1921) 77.
10 HoL1iEs, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1921) 179.
-1 "The Path of the Law," ibid. 167.
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eral maxims of conduct." 22 The facts count; and the facts are
aggregate experience and the relative power behind its different
elements can alone determine which group of them will prevail.
This, once more, has led him to see how much the driving power
of emotion counts in the shaping of social forces; and I should
not, I think, unduly misrepresent his view of social good if I
defined it, in William James' phrase, as the response to demand
on the largest possible scale. The Spinoza in him makes him
admit that it is good for a man to get what he wants if, other
things being-equal, he is successful in its attainment. That is
why he has described the justification of a statute as consisting
"in some help which the law brings towards reaching a social
end which the governing power of the community has made up
its mind that it wants." 13
That last sentence is, perhaps, the key to the whole political
outlook of Mr. Justice Holmes. For him, as for Spinoza, the
right of a government over its subjects is in reality its power to
command their obedience. He does not postulate ideal rights;
he infers actual rights from the empirical behavior of men. He
states Spinoza's theory in fairly unqualified terms, and then, like
Spinoza himself, sets out the grim qualifications of fact to which
its actual exercise is subject in daily life.14 He would, I think,
echo Spinoza's famous remark that "freedom and strength of
mind are virtues in private men, but the virtue of governments
is safety." For that reason, also, the psychology which under-
lies his principles is, as is essential to the judge's task, a human
nature as the courts encounter it in the system that he knows,
rather than one as it might be upon different assumptions of
social value. He has a profound sense both of the variety of
human wants, and the scarcity which characterizes our power
to satisfy them; from this is born his constant insistence upon
conflict as the root of social change. And he infers from that
conflict the need of law to regulate the expression of will in
terms of principle-the impossibility, therefore, of more than a
limited freedom for the citizen.' He would add, I think, with
Spinoza, that the reasonableness of a state is the measure of its
strength, and that reasonableness is, for the most part, the out-
come of a government's willingness to show in its activities a
decent respect for the public opinion of its citizens. 15
It is this latter attitude which forms the basis for much of his
supposed radicalism. He may admit that, logically, the sover-
eign can do no wrong simply because it isthe sovereign; but he
12 Ibid. 180.
13 Ibid. 225.
4 Kawananakoa v. Polybldnk, supra note 8. Cf. 3 SPINOZA, TRAMTATUS
POLITICUS 5-9.
15 SPINOZA, op. cit. supra note 14, at 7.
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is too impressed by the fallibility of its human agents not to
acquiesce in limitations in practice upon its power. He has in-
sisted therefore on the value of those safeguards which, col-
lectively, we call freedom; and he has been at pains to magnify
the prospect of their maintenance. A constant faith that the
other man may be right has made him vigilant about autocratic
pretension; and this has made him seek ways of attaining that
maximum self-expression in the citizen which is consistent with
the maintenance of order. Clearly enough, he dislikes extrem-
ism, partly because he distrusts all certitude, and partly because
his sense of history makes him think it wise to acquiesce in any
government which is tolerably well administered. Once more,
I believe, it is the ideal Spinoza envisaged; and one can assume
that he would echo the famous words of the fifth chapter of the
Tracatus where the great Dutch thinker tells us that "a gov-
ernment is best under which men lead a peaceable life, by which
I mean that life of man which consisteth not only in the circu-
lation of the blood and other properties common to all animals,
but whose chief part is reason and the true life and excellence
of the mind." 16
III
So much in general background. Upon the peculiar problems
of American politics, a foreigner must summarize with tre-
pidation; 27 nor can he venture to concern himself with niceties
of technical detail. Any general survey of Mr. Justice Holmes'
work upon the Supreme Court, I think, must begin by noting
the realism of his approach. He has sought to interpret the
Constitution not as a framework of immutable doctrine which
scrutinizes with jealousy all social innovation, but as a system
of limits capable of expansion in terms of new experience. It
is, as I have noted, the outcome of a sense that, in politics, the
category of time is all-important; "history," he has written,
"sets us free and enables us to make up our minds dispassion-
ately whether the survival we are enforcing answers any new
purpose when it has ceased to answer the old." 1I Because of
this, also, he has been what may be termed a liberal construction-
ist; whether it is congressional or state legislation that he is
considering, his effort has been to find room for the expression
of a power unless it runs decisively against the obvious intent
of the supreme instrument. The resilt, for him, has been a
16 Cf. HOLMES, CoLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1921) 246, 251, 290, 305, etc.
171 draw attention to Professor Frankfurter's well-kmown article, Mr.
Justice Holmes and the Constitution (1927) 41 HAMV. L. REV. 121, for an
admirable approach to this aspect.
_18HOLmS, COLLECTE LEGAL PAPERS (1921) 225.
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conscious effort to limit, where possible, the competence of the
Bench to substitute judicial for legislative view of desirable
policy. All experiment seems to him legitimate that is not
clearly forbidden.
Illustrations of this attitude abound. The American Consti-
tution is, for him, federal in that special sense which does not
deny the luxury of dubious experiment to the constituent parts.
Noble State Bank v. Haskell "" is an admirable warning against
the temptation to centralize control in the interests of superior
knowledge. So, also, the classical dissents in the Lochner 21 and
Adair 21 cases are a memorable insistence on the right of social
experiment wherever the weight of evidence would justify the
holding of a particular view by a reasonable man. Neither the
Fifth nor the Foufteenth Amendment constitute for him the
consecration of a particular economic theory; they are not a gate
but a road. "A constitution," he wrote in the former case," . . .
is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the
accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or
novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment
upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with
the Constitution of the United States." So liberty of contract
cannot be held to exclude the establishment by congress of a
minimum wage for women,22 or of the regulation of the hours
of labor,23 or of the prohibition against dismissal of men because
they are members of a labor union.24 He has insisted that the
Constitution is always perverted when it limits the victory of
a dominant opinion for whose sanity a solid body of evidence
may be arrayed in proof.
And as with the power of the states, so, also, with the au-
thority of Congress. Granted that the Supreme Court was in-
tended to pass upon the constitutionality of federal legislation,
"I suppose that we all agree that to do so is the gravest and
most delicate duty that this Court is called upon to perform." 25
It is legitimate, for example, for Congress to prohibit the move-
ment in interstate commerce of goods manufactured by child
labor; the power to regulate may reasonably include even an in
direct power to prohibit that of which the direct control has been
given to the statesY And he has so interpreted congressional
power as to argue that it is the business of the Court, if it rea-
19 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186 (1911).
20 Lochner v. New York, supra note 7.
2 1 Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277 (1908).
22 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (1923).
23 Lochner v. New York, supra note 7; and of. Ellis v. United States,
206 U. S. 246, 27 Sup. Ct. 600 (1907).
24 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240 (1915).
25 Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 147, 48 Sup. Ct. 105, 107 (1927).
26 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 277, 38 Supt. Ct. 529, 533 (1918).
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sonably can, so to interpret the statute as to save the Act, an
attitude of which his dissent in the Emnployers' Liability Cases --
is a good example. Nor is this all. le is not prepared to force
upon Congress the duty of a mechanical uniformity in its legis-
lation unless, as in the eighth section of the first Article of the
Constitution, uniformity is specifically enjoined; "I cannot
doubt," he has written, "that in matters with which Congress
is empowered to deal it may make different arrangements for
widely different localities with perhaps widely different needs." 3
On all this, and its implication, I venture with temerity to
make one comment. It seems to me that Mr. Justice Holmes
way of approaching the nature of American federalism has en-
abled him to render to its interpretation a service comparable
in magnitude with that of Marshall over a century ago. Exactly
as the latter preserved the Constitution from the vice of a nar-
row particularism, so Mr. Justice Holmes has saved it from be-
coming the prisoner of a narrow individualism. He has done
so by recognizing that what he has called the "inarticulate major
premise" 29 of the judge is not entitled to set limits to possible
and reasonable conceptions of social welfare. Again a foreigner
must speak with hesitation; but I hazard the judgment that, in
this regard, his opinions have been a major factor in the last
generation in maintaining popular respect for the Supreme Court
at a high level.
One foundation for this attitude lies, I think, in his concep-
tion of the nature of judicial power. American judges have too
often taken the theory of the separation of powers as though
by some divine prescription it enabled the Bench to declare the
law without making it. Mr. Justice Holmes has seen deeper.
"I recognize without hesitation," he has written, "that judges do
and must legislate." 30 But, because the legislative aspect of
their task is "confined from molar to molecular motions," they
are not entitled to replace legislative decision by their own. The
legislature is not to be hampered by judicial control unless the
limitation proceeds from the plain words of the Constitution.31
Indeed, so far is he prepared to go in this view that, as far as
Congressional legislation is concerned, he has declared his doubt
whether "the United States would come to an end" if the judicial
27207 U. S. 463, 541, 28 Sup. Ct. 141, 163 (1908); cf. the explicit declara-
tion of this view in Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (1927).
2s Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 169, 40 Sup. Ct. 438,
443 (1920).
29 In the Lochner case, supra note 7.
30 Southern Pacific v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 221, 37 Sup. Ct. 524, 530
(1917); cf. Springer v. Government of Philippines, 277 U. S. 189, 209, 48
Sup. Ct. 480, 485 (1928).
" Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U. S.
430, 25 Sup. Ct. 466 (1905).
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veto were abolished. 32 He has been deeply concerned by legal
ignorance of political economy, and the tendency of some courts
to read into Constitutions "acceptance of the economic doctrines
which prevailed about fifty years ago, and a wholesale prohibi-
tion of what a tribunal of lawyers does not think about right." "'
So he has preached to his judicial brethren what may perhaps
be best termed the duty of intellectual humility, the obligation
not to identify constitutionalism with social theories which hap-
pen to coincide with their own scheme of preferences. And it
is worth while pointing out that this realist view of the judicial
function is perhaps more true to what the theory of the separa-
tion of powers was in fact intended to secure than others which
are less candid in their insight. For, the court whose prohibi-
tions control the acts of a legislature accumulates in its hands
those varied powers which Madison insisted became the very
definition of tyranny.
What I have called his intellectual humility can be shown in
many ways. It lies at the base of his conception of the police
power, particularly in its relation to the Fourteenth Amendment.
"There is nothing I more deprecate," he has said, "than the use
of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion
of its words to prevent the making of social experiments that an
important part of the community desires, in the insulated cham-
bers afforded by the several states, even though the experiments
may seem futile or even noxious to me and to those whose judg-
ment I most respect." 34 It is seen, again, in his continuous effort
towards a quantitative approach to the limitations imposed by
the Constitution. We are not to search for mathematical pre-
cision in these matters; the lines of politics, as Burke said, are
broad and deep as well as long.35
A word is necessary upon the manner in which Mr. Justice
Holmes has approached the interpretation of the Bill of Rights
under the Constitution. Again, his method of analysis has been
quantitative in character. He has refused to regard it as a l!st
of absolute prohibitions. Membership in the state, for him, in-
volves the surrender of the absolute in politics. For, in the
first place, extraordinary situations may demand extraordinary
remedies; "when it comes," he has written, "to a decision by the
head of the State upon a matter involving its life, the ordinary
rights of individuals must yield to what he deems the necessi-
ties of the moment. Public danger warrants the substitution
32 HOLMES, CoLLEcTED LEGAL PAPERs (1921) 295.
33 Ibid. 184.
34 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 134 (1921).
35 Cf., e.g., Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270 U. S. 402, 415, 46 Sup. Ct. 320,
323 (1926) ; Frost & Frost v. Railroad Commission of California, 271 U. S.
583, 600, 46 Sup. Ct. 605, 609 (1926). It is a constantly recurring idea.
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of executive process for judicial process."0 And, in the second,
the exercise of any right is always subject to the limitation that
it shall not provoke those circumstances out of which an immedi-
ate and direct threat to public safety may arise; "the most
stringent protection of free speech," he has argued, "would not
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic." 7 But, subject to such margins, Mr. Justice Holmes has
always favored, as the very notable dissent in the Abrams
case 38 makes plain, a narrow construction of safeguards intended
to protect the interests of personality in their civic expression.
For, as he has said, though persecution for opinion may be logi-
cal, "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market." 20 So, also,
he has argued against any broad interpretation of the Post-
master-General's authority to control the freedom of the press
by the refusal of the mailing privilege.40 So, once more, in the
Frank case, he could not concur in the denial of a fair trial even
when the forms of jury procedure had been superficially satis-
fied.41
In this realm, I think, there is a marked resemblance between
the ideas of Bentham and those of Mr. Justice Holmes. - For
both, the need for security is paramount; and the enjoyment of
individual rights is secondary in every case to that major end.
But, with him as with Bentham, once the major end is safe, the
protection of the individual from arbitrary control is a sacred
obligation. Rights may be born of the law; but their plain
intent is to curb the authority of government, and it is therefore
peculiarly incumbent upon the judiciary to watch with special
care their active exercise.
One final aspect of his attitude may be noticed. I have already
observed that in matters of economic constitution the leanings
of Mr. Justice Holmes are towards the classic doctrines of the
nineteenth century; some, indeed, of his pronouncements upon
socialism have about them a note of acid scorn! 3 But that has
not meant with him, as it has not seldom meant in decisions
of the Supreme Court, an effort to exalt the rights of property
into a place of special privilege in the state. So long as a gov-
ernment treats the owner of an acquired title with fairness, he
36 Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78, 85, 29 Sup. Ct. 235, 237 (1909).
37Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 54, 39 Sup. Ct. 247, 249 (1919).
3 Abrams v. United States, supra note 6.
39 Ibid. 630, 40 Sup. Ct. at 22.
40 United States v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 436, 41 Sup. Ct. 352, 363
(1921).
41 Frank v. Magnum, 237 U. S. 309, 345, 35 Sup. Ct. 582, 594 (1915).
42 Cf. BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MoRALs AD LEGISLATION (Oxford ed.
1907) 224 and n.1.
43 HOLMES, CoiLxCTE LEAL PAFERS (1921) 279, 306.
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is "infected with the original weakness of dependence upon the
will of the state. '44 It is impossible to hold that "all property
owners in a State have a vested right that no general proposi-
tion of law shall be reversed, changed or modified by the courts
if the consequence to them will be more or less pecuniary loss." 41
A state cannot be prevented from discouraging particular forms
of economic activity by special methods of taxation.4 0 Property
may not be taken without compensation, "but with the help of
a phrase, (the police power) some property may be taken or
destroyed for public use without paying for it, if you do not
take too much. When we come to the fundamental distinctions,
it is still more obvious that they must be received with a certain
latitude or our government could not go on." 47 He has pro-
tested on many occasions against an effort to make the Four-
teenth Amendment a method for specially protecting the rights
of property by reading into it a "delusive exactness" which is,
in sober fact, contrary to its nature. "By calling a business
'property,'" he has urged, "you make it seem like land, and lead
up to the conclusion that a statute cannot substantially cut down
the advantages of ownership existing before the statute was
passed.... It is a course of conduct and like other conduct, is
subject to substantial modification according to time and circum-
stances both in itself and in regard to what shall justify doing
it a harm. . . .Legislation may begin where an evil begins." 48
The last sentence is the key to the whole. The inherent power
of the state to meet its problems as they may arise is, for him,
the unassailable and primordial postulate of political science.
To that end it possesses sovereignty; and the limitations upon
the exercise of its power are, in his conception, what may be
termed limitations of manner rather than of substance. Judi-
cial prohibitions, therefore, must be aimed not at the object
sought for, but at the way in which the object is sought. Ad-
mittedly, manner and substance shade off inextricably the one
into the other; "the great ordinances of the Constitution do not
establish and divide fields of black and white." 49 But it is in
the recognition that mathematical exactitude is not attainable
in social legislation, that, accordingly, unless the individual
right is gravely invaded the social interest must prevail, that
44 Western Union v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 55 30 Sup, Ct. 190, 209 (1910).
-BMuhlker v. New York & Harlem R. R., 197 U. S. 544, 574, 25 Sup. Ct.
522, 529 (1905).
4G Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 403, 48 Sup. Ct.
553, 555 (1928).
47 Springer v. Government 6f Philippine Islands, supra note 30, at 210,
48 Sup. Ct. at 485.
48 Truax v. Corrigan, supra note 34, at 342, 42 Sup. Ct. at 133.
49.Springer v. Government of Philippine Islands, supra note 30 at 209,
48 Sup. Ct. at 485.
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the criterion of constitutionality must be found. It is difficult
not to feel that Mr. Justice Holmes' long emphasis upon this
attitude has humanized the jurisprudence of the United States.
IV
In the proud preface to Mlontesquieu's last work there are cer-
tain words than which none are more fitting to Mr. Justice
Holmes' labors. "When I have seen," wrote Mlontesquieu, "what
so many great men in France, England and Germany have writ-
ten before me, I have been lost in admiration, but without losing
my courage; I, too, am a painter, I have said with Correggio."
That, as I think, has been the secret of Mr. Justice Holmes' pre-
eminence in his time. It is not only that he has had the schol-
ar's breadth of knowledge. It is not merely, either, that he has
realized how the facts call the judge, and especially, perhaps, the
American judge, to the tasks of statesmanship. Both these
qualities he has had in full measure. But, above all, he has had
the great artist's power of penetrating with the vision of genius
to the essential, of making the bridge between the little fact of
daily life and the sweeping generalization by which a state rises
to the consciousness of its purpose. He has done it with singu-
lar felicity of expression, and with unvarying integrity of mind.
We can only be humbly grateful in the presence of so rare and
so distinguished an achievement.
1931]
